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Abstract 
 
Frameworks for IT evaluation have been extensively discussed in the past. Until recently, 
research had concentrated on advancing classic approaches such as monetary cost/benefit 
considerations or strategic management matrices, but that constriction to known methods has 
considerably softened. More researchers now use economic models in IT evaluation. Their 
contributions open exciting new perspectives but unfortunately the models put forward 
cannot reach wide in practice as they are highly formalized. Addressing the use of economic 
theory in IS research, this paper attempts to fully operationalize an economic theory into a 
framework apt for management. Exemplarily, in a “research method case study”, we 
operationalize Principal-Agent theory for a specific organizational setting. The particular 
situation we develop the framework for is collective investment into Information Technology 
(such as collaborative Supply Chain Management systems or collective reservation systems 
for airline networks). The four steps we conduct in our operationalization are translation, 
scenario building, structured qualitative analysis and aggregation. Along with presenting the 
complete operationalization process, the final framework demonstrates that a complex 
Principal-Agent problem can be transcribed into an easy to use IS management framework. 
 
Keywords: IT evaluation, methodology, new institutional economics, Principal-Agent theory, 
management framework 
 
 
1. Introduction: towards an economic approach to IT evaluation 
Ways of measuring the business value of information systems have been hotly debated in IS 
research ever since the discipline was founded (Banker and Kaufmann 2004). In general, two 
streams of evaluation methods can be identified. One uses financial measures such as 
anticipated costs and benefits, the other tries to grasp strategic implications of IS. Evaluation 
frameworks have been refined extensively in the past years; other approaches try to bring 
relevant perspectives together (see, for example, Melville et al. 2004). Economic theory has 
long found its way into IT evaluation (e.g. Gold 1964, Kriebel and Raviv 1980 or Thatcher 
and Pingry 2004, Kumar 2004, Han et al. 2004), but as these models are highly formalized, 
their application in management is made difficult if not impossible. 
In the course of researching IT evaluation methods for a particular setting (collective IT 
investments), we find that not a refinement of existing management tools but a novel one 
based on economic theory is needed. To Williamson (1985, p. 121-122), drawing on an 
economic analysis of the Japanese way of cooperating, opportunism is the major inhibitor for 
investing collectively. So if no collective governance structures exist which can handle 
opportunistic behaviour (such as in cooperations between independent partners which can be 
found e.g. in supply chains or the airline industry), the risk for opportunism intrinsic to 
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investment options must be measured. As Principal-Agent (PA) theory is primarily concerned 
with the analysis of contracting parties behaving opportunistically, we choose to 
operationalize this part of the new institutional economics. In essence, we derive a 
management framework for comparing the relative advantageousness of collective 
investment scenarios in regard to the risk for opportunism associated to them.  
This paper can be regarded as an exploratory methodological case study. Exploratory case 
studies constitute a prelude to other methods of social science research and are generally 
conducted when a phenomenon requires a first access. “Such a phenomenon may be a project 
or program in an evaluation study” (Yin 2003, p. 4). In this paper, the project/phenomenon is 
our research effort in the field of operationalizing economic theory for IS research. So what is 
new is that we do not classically describe a practical business phenomenon but a practical 
research case. The paper’s primary contribution is to demonstrate a practical example of 
economic theory operationalization in IS research. Hence, the results of the case itself are 
not as important as the case’s structured description which follows our research process.  
The paper’s structure reflects this objective. Besides supplying the reader with background on 
the investigation’s setting (cooperations between independent companies, also known as 
inter-firm networks) and relevant elements of the investigation’s model (Principal-Agent 
theory), section 2 draws analogies to other attempts at operationalizing economic theory 
(investigation method). Section 3 is arranged along the lines of our own operationalization 
efforts: translation, scenario building, structured qualitative analysis and aggregation. In 
addition to stating shortcomings of our operationalization attempt, section 4 provides a short 
summary and a brief outlook. 
 
2. Relevant Background 
2.1. Investigation setting: collective IT investments in inter-firm networks 
Cooperations between companies exist in manifold varieties such as joint ventures, strategic 
alliances and inter-firm networks. Definitions of and classification criteria for these different 
types of cooperations are numerous, but, in general, most classifications include dimensions 
such as financial/legal independence of the participating partners, resource catenation, 
cooperation time/scope and size.  
Inter-firm networks represent a type of cooperation which emphasizes the independence of 
the participants (Miles and Snow 1986, Davidow and Malone 1992, Haecki and Lighton 
2001, Veil and Hess 2002, Sturgeon 2002; NB: in our understanding virtual organizations 
form a subset of inter-firm networks). In respect to the typical classification criteria stated 
above, inter-firm networks are special as 
(1) the partners are financially and legally independent and they do not primarily pool 
their resources (unlike setting up a joint venture where partners incorporate resources 
into a new firm), 
(2) inter-firm networks are not limited in cooperation time and cooperation scope (unlike 
strategic alliances where cooperation is limited to a specific transactional aspect, e.g. 
5 year preferred supplier relationships), 
(3) every time an order arrives which is to be dealt with within the network, the 
configuration of the participating partners might change (see figure 1) and 
(4) the number of participants in inter-firm networks can easily exceed 10 partners. 
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Partner 1
Partner 3
Partner 4 Partner ...
Partner 2
Order 1 Order 2 Order ...
Partnerpool
 
Figure 1: Order-based partner configuration (Veil and Hess 2002, p. 274) 
 
An example of an international inter-firm network is the airline network Star Alliance. Here, 
15 financially and legally independent national carriers align their operations to jointly 
provide services to end customers. For example, passengers can travel across the entire Star 
Alliance Network using one single e-ticket. This was made possible by linking the individual 
carriers’ IT systems via Star Alliance’s collective IT infrastructure, StarNet. Benefits include 
reduced complexity, improved customer service and lower costs for member carriers. 
As indicated in the Star Alliance example collective IT infrastructures, which form the basis 
of interorganizational systems (IOS), will typically not be set up in Greenfield projects. 
Rather, the individual partners’ systems will be integrated in one form or another as Eom 
(2005, p. 4) defines: “An interorganizational system is an information and management 
system that transcendents organizational boundaries via electronic linkages.” Methods and 
standards for integrating IT systems are hotly debated in practice and research and include 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), eXtended Markup Language (XML), decentralized 
Enterprise Application Integration (EAI), hub-and-spoke EAI, web services and central 
databases. Within these technologies and methods, two architectural approaches can be 
differentiated: centralization and decentralization. For instance, hub-and-spoke EAI (a 
middleware including adaptors, transformation services and process management tools) and 
collective databases represent centralized architectures while changing to a common standard 
counts towards the other option. Still, they all constitute investments into 
relationship-specific IT. The IT options’ common characteristic is that they all serve as a 
common infrastructure set between enterprise-wide and public infrastructures (for a 
categorization see Weill et al. 2002). 
 
2.2. Investigation model: Principal-Agent theory 
Principal-Agent (PA) theory is part of the new institutional economics and has several early 
contributors including Spence and Zeckhauser  (1971), Ross (1973) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). A PA relationship is defined “as a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority” (Jensen and Meckling 
1976, p. 308). Today, in essence, PA theory deals with problems which arise whenever the 
principal cannot perfectly and costlessly assess the agent’s action and information (“which is 
almost always the case”, Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985, p. 2) and the agent derives scope for 
opportunistic behavior from this information asymmetry.  
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In the tradition of new institutional economics, PA theory assumes bounded rationality and 
individual utility maximization. The information asymmetry ( bounded rationality) 
between principal and agent leads to a discretionary scope for autonomous and therefore 
opportunistic behavior on the agent’s side ( utility maximization). Such situations typically 
exist in buyer-supplier, owner-manager and venture capitalist-investee but also in 
landlord-tenant or doctor-patient relationships (Wigand et al. 1997). As PA is a basic 
economic theory, it can explicitly be applied to any social situation (Ross 1973). Naturally, 
one person can find himself in numerous PA relationships, acting as principal in one, as agent 
in another context or even as principal and agent in reciprocal relationships (Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1985).  
When trying to reduce the uncertainties the information asymmetry poses, principals incur 
monitoring expenditures while agents have to commit resources to bonding. In addition, 
certain transactions do not take place which would have been beneficial to overall welfare 
(residual loss). These three items add up to Agency-costs which differ among organizational 
arrangements (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
In detail, three problems emerge from the underlying information asymmetry: (1) hidden 
action (2) hidden intention and (3) hidden characteristics (Wigand et al.1997).  
(1) After the contract has been signed the principal cannot observe or judge the agent’s 
efforts (hidden action) and the agent can maximize his utility at the expense of the 
principal. This phenomenon is known also known as “moral hazard”.  
(2) In addition, the post-contractual intentions of the agent remain hidden. As the 
principal ex-ante advances resources (constituting sunk costs) to enter a specific 
relationship, he is then dependent upon the agent. Ex-post, he can observe the agent’s 
actions but cannot change them. The resulting scope for opportunistically exploiting 
this dependency is categorized as “hold up”.  
(3) Hidden characteristics are based on the assumption that the principal cannot 
accurately judge the quality of the agent’s offer before the contract is signed. The key 
problem with hidden characteristics is not primarily opportunistic behavior itself but 
the information asymmetry’s final consequence: it results in adverse selection, where 
unfavorable agents chosen which will, in extreme cases, lead to the closing of 
markets. By now, numerous tested strategies for reducing pre-contractual information 
asymmetries exist. Still, the problem’s focus is not on opportunism itself. Therefore 
hidden characteristics will not be pursued further in this analysis. 
In general, Principal-Agent theory can be used to explain (positive analysis) or to design 
(normative analysis) such relationships. In normative analyses, recommendations are put 
forward as to which institutional arrangement is to be chosen (depending on agency-costs). In 
our case, a positive analysis is conducted as institutional arrangements seem to be very hard 
to establish (see introduction / see also Casciaro 2003 or Ahmadjian and Lincoln 2001) and 
hence the degree of opportunistic scope of different options is to be measured.  
 
2.3. Investigation method: operationalizing economic theory 
To our knowledge, evaluation frameworks for measuring the risk for opportunism associated 
to a specific investment have not yet been developed. In general, the aim of economic 
investigations is relative, not absolute comparison (Williamson 1991). But while economic 
comparisons are typically used with the purpose of (formally) explaining the dynamics of 
reality (in our case: governance of, structure of and investment behaviour in inter-firm 
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networks / see Han et al. 2004, Beckman et al. 2004, Solf 2004, Casciaro, 2004, Wohlgemuth 
and Hess 2003 for recent examples), our study sets out to develop a management framework 
for collective investments. 
Numerous Principal-Agent analysis were conducted for real life cases (see Reid 1977, Rubin 
1978, Block and MacMillan 1993, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995 or Casamatta 2003 on 
complex PA-analysis examples). Still, they have not been operationalized to a management 
framework. Generally, research has rather attended to operationalizing transaction cost 
theory. In this respect, we scanned transaction cost attempts in order to obtain a general idea 
for approaching the operationalization of PA theory. For our case, we tried to focus on works 
set in an atmosphere where our object of analysis, the risk for opportunism, is considered as a 
major influence on decision making: IT sourcing. Our analysis harvested three approaches: 
(1) quantifying transaction costs in order to use the figures in cost accounting (e.g. Albach 
1988), (2) quantifying the level of perceived transaction cost (e.g. Ang and Straub 1998) and 
(3) breaking down transaction cost into qualitatively assessable variables (e.g. Dibbern et al. 
2003 who explain the correlation between transaction and production cost in outsourcing by 
discerning qualitative context variables such as specific process knowledge, trust and location 
specificity).  
Option (1) has been widely discussed, but contradicts the idea of relative economic 
comparison and has not yielded substantial results so far (Burr 2003). While the results of 
option (2) would foster the individual reflection of the personal decision making situation of a 
cooperation partner, option (3) additionally yields a basis for discussion and negotiation 
within the inter-firm network, as the composition of the risk levels is transparently developed 
in a structured manner. Therefore, option 3 will be pursued for operationalizing PA theory in 
our case.  
 
3. Operationalization case study 
As discussed in section 2.3, breaking down the decision making situation at hand into 
qualitatively assessable variables seems to be the most promising approach for categorical 
operationalization in our setting. Following scientific method, we have to distinguish between 
exogenous (independent) and endogenous (dependent) variables. In our case, the endogenous 
variable (the one we wish to measure for different types of collective IT investment) is the 
risk level as induced by hidden action and hidden intention respectively. The independent 
variables make up types of collective IT investments.   
While the endogenous variable is clear, it is imperative to define adequate independent 
variables. Hence we first translate the setting of investing collectively into PA-theory: who 
can – abstracted away from a real case – take on the roles of Principal and Agent? Then, we 
build scenarios which are made up of all realistically possible combinations of PA-roles and 
participants in the real world. These scenarios constitute aggregations of independent 
variables. Then we analyse all information asymmetries ( qualitatively assessable 
dependent variables) in those scenarios and record the results in a structured, comparable 
manner. Finally, we aggregate these results to arrive at a comprehensive risk assessment 
framework. Figure 2 summarizes this process. 
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Translation
What is the Agent’s task?
Who is Principal, who is Agent?
Scenario building
Which different types of collective IT investment are possible?
Structured qualitative analysis
Analyzing the relevant risks in all scenarios.
Result aggregation
Pulling the individual risk analyses together.  
Figure 2: Operationalization process 
 
3.1. Translation 
As indicated in section 2.2, Principal-Agent relations can be quite complex as they might 
encompass multiple agents and multiple principals and even be reciprocal (Grossmann and 
Hart 1983, Pratt and Zeckhauser, Arrow 1985, Wigand et al. 1997). Therefore, when 
analysing relationships in terms of Principal-Agent theory, it is imperative that all relevant 
roles of the participating players are clearly stated from the beginning. In order to supply a 
starting point for the following positive analysis and a quick-reference for readers, this 
section will first give an overview of the relevant roles.  
In the case of collective IT investment, three roles can be identified. One company might take 
on several roles; one role can be taken on by many companies. 
• Beneficiary: Any network member who links up to the collective IS in order to 
benefit from using it. Beneficiaries do not necessarily have to invest into the 
collective IS.  
• Investor: Any network member who actively designs and pays for setting up and 
running the system and benefits from using it himself and/or others using it. Investors 
hold most property rights to the system (system owners). If there are multiple 
investors, the total cost of the system is shared; if only one partner invests, he carries 
the total cost himself.  
• Supplier: The institution which sets up and runs the system. Depending on the 
architecture/sourcing option chosen, suppliers can either be all investors, one/a small 
group of investors or an external supplier. 
 
Relevant players can be clearly identified in all collective IT investments, an interesting 
example being the papiNet integration project. papiNet set out as a global transaction 
standard initiative and can now be regarded as an inter-firm network in our terminology (due 
to flexible production configuration, legal and financial independence of the partners, high 
number of partners and unlimited cooperation scope; see section 2.1). In June 2001, all major 
papiNet partners (a group of 80 print-media companies including publishers, printing shops, 
logistics companies and paper manufacturers) introduced ebXML-based communication 
software: Ponton X/P. This software (legacy system adaptors + messenger) is based on 
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open-source products, but had to be customized to match industry processes. Development 
costs were completely covered by the paper manufactures, whilst customization itself was 
outsourced to Ponton Consulting. Cleary, all network members who introduce this 
decentralized collective information system gain benefits from it in terms of process and 
resource economies (beneficiaries). At first, the paper manufacturers designed and paid the 
system (investors) but also benefit from the linking up to it (beneficiaries). Ponton 
Consulting, which developed the system, was the supplier of the collective IS at this stage of 
the project. 
Figure 3 depicts an overview of the Principal-Agent relationships players can find themselves 
in. While the problems within these relations will be discussed in more detail later, this first 
classification is needed for describing important scenarios.  
 
Beneficiary
Investor
Supplier
321
Agent Principal
Principal -Agent relationship
PrincipalPrincipal Agent
Agent
Role
Beneficiary
has mandate
to use the IOS
Investor has 
mandate to 
design the IOS
Supplier has 
mandate to 
run the IOS
 
Figure 3: Generic Principal-Agent map for collective IS investment (Hirnle 2005, p. 10) 
 
• PA-relationship 1: A collective IS generates value only if enough network partners 
(beneficiaries) participate. So, once the investors have committed their resources to 
the investment (and have hence incurred sunk costs), they are dependent on the other 
network members to take part in the collective IS. If all investors are also 
beneficiaries, all network members are principals and agents to each other in this 
respect. 
• PA-relationship 2: At the same time, in order to secure participation of enough 
beneficiaries, the investor must build an IS the partners agree with. In other words, the 
investor is commissioned to design and build an IOS on behalf of the participating 
partners. If all beneficiaries are also investors, all network members are principals and 
agents to each other in this respect. 
• PA-relationship 3: The investor-supplier relationship is PA-classic. The investors 
select a supplier (network partner or external institution) to set up and run the 
collective IS. During the selection phase, investors incur transaction costs. Once the 
690 
supplier (agent) is selected, the investors (principals) pay the supplier for setting up 
and running the IS.  
 
3.2. Scenario building 
The PA-relationships modelled here bear great potential for opportunistic behaviour. 
However, the degree of discretionary scope for opportunistic action varies depending on how 
the investment atmosphere is shaped. The optimal shape of that atmosphere for a company 
depends on its individual position within the network, or, in other words, the role it takes on 
(Baker et al. 2002). When considering information asymmetries between the parties, the 
question is to what extent the participants take on all roles or to what extent the roles are 
divided amongst individual parties. The differentiating criterion between beneficiary and 
investor is optional investing (beneficiaries can, but do not necessarily have to invest). If 
suppliers are external to the network, they are separate entities with own information levels. 
If suppliers are internal, roles are combined. Hence, four possible scenarios can be identified 
(graphically depicted in Figure 4) which differ by the amount of partners who incur 
expenditures for designing, setting up and running the IOS (all partners or only a fraction of 
the partners) and how the IOS is sourced.  
 
Scenario 2:
balanced
cooperation
Scenario 4:
arm‘s lenght
cooperation
Scenario 1:
self-reliant
cooperation
Scenario 3:
trust-based
cooperation
Investor
(who designs and 
pays for the 
collective IS?)
Supplier 
(of collective IS)
Network
member
External
institution
All partners*
A fraction of 
the partners*
* partners who use the 
IOS constitute beneficiaries 
Figure 4: Principal-Agent scenarios in collective IS investment (Hirnle 2005, p. 12) 
 
Certainly, a PA-relationship also exists between beneficiaries and suppliers. However, we 
chose to refrain from a detailed analysis of this relationship as the relationship between 
investing beneficiaries and suppliers is already modelled in PA-relationship 3 and we believe 
that a central difference between scenarios 2 and 4 lies in cutting off non-investing 
beneficiaries from suppliers. 
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3.3. Structured qualitative analysis 
In this section, the two potential information asymmetries (hidden action, hidden intention) 
ought to be discussed in regard to the three Principal-Agent relationships in all four scenarios, 
the central measure being the risk for opportunism. As this paper’s objective is to 
demonstrate the process of operationalization, merely one sample scenario will be discussed 
here. We choose to go into investment scenario 2 (balanced cooperation) as this scenario 
represents the most advantageous approach in comparison to the other scenarios. It has to be 
said that when displaying one scenario only, the transparency of the risk ratings is diminished 
as the reader cannot place the derivation of the rating into relation to the other scenarios’ 
discussions. Still, the operationalization step “structured qualitative analysis” is made clear. A 
detailed analysis of all scenarios can be found in Hirnle (2005). 
 
Scenario classification 
In the balanced cooperation scenario, all network members ex-ante agree to bear their share 
of the costs of the collective IS (unlike scenarios 3 & 4). All beneficiaries are also investors. 
Unlike scenario 1, however, the supplier is a company external to the network. In other 
words, the collective IS is sourced “in-network” in scenario 1 and is now being “outsourced” 
in scenario 2. One central difference for our analysis is that external providers allow 
usage-based fees (such as application service providers - ASPs). An example for this scenario 
would be a collaborative supply chain management system which is run by a third party 
vendor. 
 
Risk 1: Hidden action/moral hazard 
Relationship 1: Grave hidden action information asymmetries exist in this investor (principal) 
- beneficiary (agent) relationship. The central moral hazard feature here is known as free 
riding, was first focused by Holmstrom (1982) and has been attributed to inter-firm networks 
by Rokkan and Buvik (2003). In our context, free riding denotes a situation where network 
members enjoy the benefits of the common good (here: IOS usage rights) without having to 
bear the full costs: either an investor understates his benefit derived from the IOS and pays 
less or the ex-ante investor changes his mind and refuses to pay at all. The free riding partner 
can do so as a) partners cannot adequately judge the utility to the free rider and hence cannot 
know that he is free riding and b) the utility of the IOS depends on all partners participating, 
and hence the network members will not always exclude the free rider from using it. 
However, investors will only invest if they expect an individual positive return and that return 
is in a fair relation to the returns the other investors receive (Wohlgemuth and Hess 2003). 
Fundamentally, investors find themselves in catch 22: while they are basically willing to pay 
for a collective service, they could potentially have higher returns if they engaged in free 
riding.  
Free riding is particularly important topic in this scenario and can, in extreme cases, lead to 
an inadequate IOS or even inhibit its installation. When entering an outsourcing relationship, 
both the provider and the investor incur information and communication costs during the 
initiation, negotiation, settlement, adaptation and control of the exchange (commonly known 
as transaction costs, Williamson 1975). The provider will add his transaction costs to the 
price he charges. The investors have to add their transaction costs to their net expenditure for 
the IOS. When an ex-ante investor deflects and chooses to free ride, he can examine the 
negotiated contracts after the process has ended. If he favors the contract, he can realise it 
without incurring as high transaction costs. If he considers the conditions to be inappropriate, 
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he can either not introduce the IOS at all or negotiate his own contract. He defers his decision 
to participate into the future without taking extra risks. The reduced transaction costs and 
his real option to defer the investment both constitute potential extra utility to the agent. In 
addition, typical outsourced IT is highly standardised. As the outsourcing contracts 
themselves reflect this feature, network partners can more easily deflect from the group of 
original investors. Hence, sourcing an IOS externally when all beneficiaries ex-ante agree to 
be investors even increases the danger of free riding due to standardised contracts. 
Therefore, the risk for opportunistic behaviour due to moral hazard is considered to be 
very high. 
Relationship 2: As all beneficiaries invest and hence take part in system/outsourcing contract 
design, information asymmetries can be ruled out. When an ex-ante investor chooses to free 
ride and become a beneficiary only, he can still be quite sure to obtain access to an 
appropriate IOS due to the high degree of standardization. The same goes for the remaining 
investors, if, of course, enough network partners participate in the design. Hence, only a low 
risk can be identified. 
Relationship 3: If an external entity sets up and runs the IOS, a hidden action information 
asymmetry arises between the investors and the supplier. While the supplier’s performance 
can be measured and managed through Service-Level-Agreements, the inter-firm network 
looses control over how the IOS is run (e.g. what happens to externally saved data). Overall, 
however, as external suppliers typically handle several clients, all these clients undertake 
monitoring to some extent. So the more standardized and the more centralized an 
outsourced IOS is, the lower monitoring costs to the individual partners are. Therefore, 
moral hazard is unlikely which leads to a low risk for opportunistic behavior.  
 
Risk 2: Hidden intention/hold up 
Relationship 1: When all beneficiaries invest, no hold up problems occur. Only if moral 
hazard sets in (in the shape of free riding), investors will have sunk costs and will then be 
dependent on the participants. Unlike scenario 1, where an internal supplier has to shoulder 
the IT investment sum, the external supplier carries the biggest part of the original investment 
in this scenario. The sunk costs investors (inter-firm network partners) incur are transaction 
costs which are far lower than the costs of the original IT investment. While the risk by itself 
is medium, the relatively low sunk costs the investors incur lead to a low level of risk in this 
relationship. 
Relationship 2: No risk can be identified when all beneficiaries invest. In free riding 
situations, the reduced functionality due to free riders not taking part in the design process of 
the IOS can be considered minimal. That is, of course, if enough partners do actively invest. 
In all, the risk is very low. 
Relationship 3: The key factor determining hold up problems in investor-supplier 
relationships is transaction specificity. Typically, inter-firm network IT is considered to by 
highly specific (e.g. common standards, common databases, etc.). From an ex-ante hidden 
intention perspective, however, this is not necessarily the case: as there can be an intense 
market-based competition for the contract, the economic specificity of the transaction is 
relatively low. Once the supplier is chosen, however, a fundamental transformation occurs 
(Williamson 1985): with the supplier building up idiosyncratic knowledge about the network 
he gains advantages over competitors which they cannot catch up. This way, an ex-ante 
starting position with low specificity can, over time, lead to a monopoly-like exchange 
situation.  
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In scenario 1 (all partners invest, IOS is sourced in-network) hold up is very strong as the 
system’s specificity helps the internal supplier to hide his intentions to a very high degree.  
When sourcing externally, however, specificity is likely to be reduced for two reasons: a) 
investors have an interest in standardized systems as they want to be able to source the IOS 
from another supplier and hence reduce the risk for fundamental transformation and b) 
suppliers have an interest in standardized systems as they want to be able to sell the same 
resource to other customers. Even if suppliers do not agree to/cannot offer a standardized 
system, hold up is low due to reputation effects. As a supplier’s key business is IT provision, 
reputation loss would directly affect his business. In other words, the supplier incurs 
signaling costs by not behaving opportunistically and, this way, builds up his reputation. So 
even when taking into consideration that the externally sourced system can have different 
levels of specificity, the risk for hold up is regarded to be rather low. 
 
Summary of scenario 2 
Relative to scenario 1 (all beneficiaries invest, IOS is sourced in-network), the risk for 
opportunistic behavior is notably reduced. This is particularly true for a reduced risk for sunk 
costs and a lower probability of opportunistic behavior on the supplier’s side. However, the 
potential free riding of ex-ante investors is facilitated. Table 1 summarizes the evaluation 
carried out. 
 
Risk for opportunistic behavior due to Relationship  Hidden action Hidden intention Risk summary 
1 
Principal: Investor 
Agent: Beneficiary 
High Low  
2 
Principal: Beneficiary  
Agent: Investor 
Low Low  
3 
Principal: Investor  
Agent: Supplier 
Low Low  
Table 1: Summary of analysis for scenario 2 
(Reading example: in relationship 2 of this scenario,  
the principals (beneficiaries) face an overall low risk for opportunism) 
 
3.4. Aggregation 
In the original study, all scenarios are discussed in the same structured manner and the 
discussions’ results are all recorded in a risk summary table for the individual relationships. 
The tables now have to be restructured to reflect management structures aggregated to reduce 
complexity. In short: while the discussions lead to scenario summaries, a management 
framework must take on a stakeholder-based view. The risk levels assessments have to be 
carried over into risk assessment frameworks for investors and beneficiaries respectively. 
Restructuring the tables to reflect the stakeholder structure leads to the final risk assessment 
framework which is depicted in Figure 5.  
The risk levels shown can easily be reconstructed from the summary of analysis for scenario 
2 (table 1). For example, when all partners invest and the IOS is outsourced (scenario 2), the 
694 
investors’ risk is aggregated to . This rating is averaged from to the investors’ opportunism 
risks for relationship 1 () and relationship 3 (). 
 
Opportunism risk levels for beneficiaries
Investor
Sourcing option
Outsourcing
All partners
A fraction 
of the partners
!
!!
!
Insourcing
Investor
Sourcing option
Insourcing 
(decentralized IOS 
architecture)
Outsourcing
All partners
A fraction 
of the partners
!
!
Insourcing 
(centralized IOS 
architecture)
Opportunism risk l vels for investo s
!
!
!
!
*
* Reading example: when only a fraction of the partners can be counted towards the investors and outsourcing is chosen as the IOS sourcing 
option , investors face a relatively low risk for opportunism whereas b eneficiaries are confronted with a high risk level.
*
 
Figure 5: Risk assessment framework (Hirnle 2005, p. 24) 
 
The framework can easily be put to practice (for an example see Hirnle 2005). After 
gathering a few basic facts on the setting (e.g. all network members/a fraction of the network 
members invest), every company must become clear about which position they take on (am I 
an investor or a beneficiary only?). With those easily accessible facts, any IOS investment 
can be positioned within the risk assessment framework and the risk level can be read off. 
Once the risk levels for the individual companies are identified, they can be discussed within 
the network and, if risk is unequally distributed, a different IOS option could be chosen.  
Naturally, the outcome of such discussions depends on factors such as strategies, negotiating 
power and risk aversions of the participants involved. Nevertheless, the framework can be 
useful for creating transparency in collective investments. So even if one partner insisted on 
keeping his opportunistic scope for action, his intentions would become clearer before the 
IOS was introduced which also constitutes a reduction of information asymmetries. 
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4. Summary, limitations and outlook 
This paper set out to demonstrate the operationalization of an economic theory for use in IS 
management. First, we quickly introduced the investigation’s setting (collective IT 
investment in inter-firm networks), model (Principal-Agent theory) and method 
(operationalization of economic theory). In section 3, our exemplary investigation was 
structured along four steps: translation, scenario building, structured qualitative analysis and 
aggregation. Our methodological case concluded with the application of the newly developed 
framework.  
Several points of critique must find a mention. First and foremost, a qualitative analysis lacks 
the apparent rigor of a formal economic model. Second, by aggregating risk levels, 
complexity might be reduced to strongly. Third, the framework is rather a basis for 
negotiation that a strict evaluation instrument in the sense of a net present value calculation. 
However, we believe that the framework represents a realistic management approach to the 
problem. 
In all, the paper presented an exploratory, methodological case study of economic theory 
operationalization for Information Systems research. In next steps, it would be interesting to 
either conduct more operationalization case studies with the structure presented here (using 
other theories and others settings) or with different approaches. In the future, a standardised 
and process model, harmonised amongst the researchers in the community, would be very 
helpful for taking advantage of the economic theories’ power in IS management. 
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